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The views expressed  in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily  reflect  those of the Federal  Reserve 
System  or the Federal  Reserve  Bank of  St. Louis. Since  the  193Os, commercial  banks  in  the United  States  have 
been  permitted  to offer  only  a limited  range  of  financial 
servic “3.  At the  same  time,  firms  engaged  in  non-financial 
activities,  as well 
permitted  to  own 
as some  in  financial  industries,  have  not  been 
banks.  Such  restrictions  were  intended  to 
limit  the risk  of  bank  failure,  to avoid  conflicts  of  interest  and  to 
prevent  undue  concentration  of  financial  power.2 
l  An earlier  version  of this paper  appeared  in  Gilbert  (1988). 
2 These  restrictions  have not been  applied  to the ownership  of 
banks  by  individuals.  Individuals  who  own  bank  stock  may  own 
and  operate  firms  in  any  other  industry.  Under  the  Change  in 
Bank  Control  Act  of  1978,  individuals  and  groups  of  individuals 
acting  in concert  must apply  to the appropriate  federal  supervisory 
agency  for  permission  to acquire  the  stock  of a bank  over  certain 
percentages  of  ownership.  See  Spong  (1985),  pp.  94-95.  The 
bank  supervisory  agencies  may deny  permission  to purchase  bank 




The  purchase  would  create  a monopoly  in  any  part 
of  the banking  industry, 
The  financial  condition  of the acquiring  party  could 
adversely  affect  the bank,  or 
The  competence,  experience  or  integrity  of  the 
proposed  ownership  would  not be in  the interest  of 
1 There  have  been  many  proposals  in  recent  years  to 
permit  banking  organizations  to offer  wider  ranges  of  services. 
One  major  reason  for permitting  the common  ownership  of 
banks  and  firms  in other  industries  is based  on  concern  about 
the  role  of banks  in  financial  intermediation  in  the  future.  Some 
bank  customers  have  found  cheaper  sources  of credit  and  other 
financial  services  outside  the banking  industry.  Consequently, 
some analysts  say,  restrictions  must be relaxed  if banks  are  to 
survive. 3 
In  1991 the Bush Administration  introduced  legislation 
that  would  have  permitted  banking  organizations  to offer  a wide 
range  of  financial  services.  Congress  rejected  that  part  of  the 
proposed  legislation.  Instead,  Congress  enacted  the Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Improvement  Act  of  1991,  which 
focuses  on  changes  in  supervision  to limit  the  risk  assumed  by 
banks  in  their  existing  activities.  Thus,  arguments  to broaden 
the  range  of  services  offered  by banking  firms  remain  as 
relevant  as they  were  in  the  mid-1980s,  when  many  of  the 
proposals  for  restructuring  the  financial  system  were  drafted. 
the bank’s  depositors. 
3  Corrigan  (1987),  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
(1987),  Huertas  (1986,  1987)  and  Department  of  the  Treasury 
(1991). 
2 The  purpose  of  this paper  is to describe  several  major  proposals 
for  changing  banking  restrictions  and  to examine  the concepts 
that  underlie  these  proposals. 
CURRENT  RESTRICTIONS  ON BANKING  ACTIVITY 
At present,  the activities  of  federally  insured  commercial 
banks  are  limited  essentially  to accepting  deposits,  holding 
relatively  low-risk  securities  and  making  loans.  Banking 
organizations  may  acquire  firms  engaged  in  financial  activities 
through  bank  holding  companies  (BHCs)  -- corporations  that 
own  one  or  more  banks.  In the Bank  Holding  Company  Act 
(BHCA),  Congress  authorized  the Federal  Reserve  Board  to 
determine  what  activities  are  permissible  for  BHCs;  these 
activities,  according  to the act,  should  be  “so closely  related  to 
banking  as to be a proper  incident  thereto. ”  Banks  generally 
can engage  in  most activities  that  BHCs  are  allowed  to pursue.4 
4  Spong  (1985),  pp.  95-98.  The  major  exception  to  this 
involves  the nonbank  banks.  The  BHCA,  which  gave  the Federal 
Reserve jurisdiction  over the acquisitions  of banks by corporations, 
defined  a  bank  as  one  that  accepts  demand  deposits  and  makes 
commercial  loans.  Acquisitions  of institutions  that  did  not  accept 
demand  deposits  or make commercial  loans  were not subject  to the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  Reserve  in  its capacity  as regulator  of 
BHCs.  These  limited-service  banks are commonly  called  nonbank 
banks.  The  Competitive  Equality  Banking  Act  of  1987  (CEBA) 
closes  that loophole  in the law.  It places  restrictions  on the growth 
and  activities  of  nonbank  banks  acquired  on  or  before  March  5, 
3 A major  distinction  between  banks  and  the nonbank  subsidiaries 
of BHCs  involves  opportunities  for geographic  expansion.  The 
nonbank  subsidiaries  of  BHCs  may  have  offices  throughout  the 
nation,  whereas  nationwide  branch  banking  is not  permitted. 
BHCs  are  subject  to the  supervision  of  the Federal 
Reserve,  which  periodically  inspects  them  to determine  whether 
they  are  operating  in a sound  manner  and in compliance  with 
regulations.  Important  regulations  of BHCs  include  capital 
requirements  set by  the Federal  Reserve  and  restrictions  on 
transactions  between  banks  and  their  affiliates  designed  to limit 
the risk  assumed  by  banks.  On several  occasions,  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  has ruled  that BHCs could  not  undertake  certain 
activities  because  they  were  not closely  related  to banking, 
1987,  and  requires  firms  that  acquired  nonbank  banks  after  that 
date to sell them or restrict  their  activities  to those permissible  for 
BHCs.  The  following  restrictions  apply  to  nonbank  banks 




They  may  not engage  in  new activities. 
They  may  not  market  the  goods  or  services  of 
affiliates  or  have  their  banking  services  marketed 
through  nonbank  affiliates,  except  through  those 
marketing  arrangements  in  effect  before  March  5, 
1987, and 
Beginning  in August  1988, their  assets  may not rise 
by  more  than  7 percent  in any  12-month  period. 
CEBA  also  imposes  restrictions  on  the  daylight  overdrafts  of 
nonbank  banks. 
4 might  result  in  conflicts  of interest  or  might  have  subjected  the 
BHCs  to greater  risk.’ 
PROPOSALS  FOR  RESTRUCTURING 
SYSTEM 
THE  U.S.  BANKING 
This  section  describes  seven proposals  for  restructuring 
the U.S.  banking  system.  Although  others  could  be included, 
particularly  those  dealing  with  the entry  of banks  into  specific 
industries,  the  following  proposals  encompass  the  range  of 
options  considered  in the policy  debates  since  the  mid-1980s. 
The  key  features  of  these  seven  proposals  are 
summarized  in  table  1.  Each  proposal  would  permit  banking 
organizations  to engage  in a broader  range  of activities  than 
currently  allowed.  Essentially,  the proposals  allow  nonbanking 
services  to be offered  through  corporate  entities  (affiliates  or 
subsidiaries)  distinct  from  the banks  themselves. 
There  are  two primary  differences  among  the proposals. 
First,  they  differ  on  whether  to permit  nonfinancial  firms  to 
5 Volcker  (1986),  pp.  436-38.  The following  are  some of the 
activities  not  permissible  for  BHCs  and  the  dates  of  denials  for 
those  activities  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board:  underwriting 
general  life  insurance  (1971),  real  estate  brokerage  (1972),  land 
investment  and development  (1972),  operating  a savings  and  loan 
association  (1974)) operating  a travel  agency  (1976) and acting  as 
a  specialist  in  foreign  exchange  options  on  a  security  exchange 
(1986). 
5 acquire  banks  or  BHCs.  These  differences  reflect  conflicting 
views  on  the policies  necessary  to avoid  conflicts  of  interest, 
decreased  or unfair  competition  among  firms  offering  financial 
services  and  undue  concentration  of economic  resources.  These 
issues  have  been  discussed  extensively  elsewhere;  they  are  not 
analyzed  in this article.6 
Second,  the proposals  differ  on the policies  necessary  to 
limit  the  risk  assumed  by banks.  Note  that  the proposals  have 
some  common  features  designed  to limit  banking  risk.  Each 
proposal  in table  1 requires  banking  organizations  to offer 
nonbanking  services  through  subsidiaries  or affiliates;  moreover, 
each  includes  restrictions  on banks  lending  to their  nonbank 
subsidiaries  or affiliates.  These  proposals  rely  in part  on  the 
legal  concept  of  “corporate  separateness, ” under  which  the 
creditors  of a corporation  have  no legal  claim  on  the assets  of  a 
stockholder,  even  if that  stockholder  is another  corporation. 
Thus,  creditors  of  the nonbanking  units  of  a firm  that  also  owns 
banks  would  have  no claim  on  its banks’  assets.7 
Several  proposals  include  special  features  to limit  the  risk 
of  bank  failure  that  might  result  from  affiliation  of banks  and 
6  Rose  (1985). 
7  Black,  Miller  and Posner  (1978). 
6 nonbanking  firms.  The  Heller  proposal  (Heller  (1987))  requires 
BHCs  to absorb  all  losses  incurred  by  their  bank  subsidiaries; 
nonfinancial  firms  that acquire  BHCs would  absorb  all  losses 
incurred  by  their  BHCs.  The  FDIC  proposal  (Federal  Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation  (1987)) requires  bank  supervisors  to audit 
transactions  between  banks  and their  nonbank  affiliates  or 
subsidiaries  to determine  whether  they  are  detrimental  to the 
banks.  The  Corrigan  proposal  (Corrigan  (1987))  relies  on  direct 
supervision  of the  firms  that buy  banks  to limit  the  risk  they 
assume.  Finally,  the Litan  proposal  (Litan  (1987))  requires 
banks  purchased  by  nonbanking  firms  to hold  only  low-risk 
liquid  assets.’ 
A FRAMEWORK  FOR  ANALYZING  THE  RISK OF  BANK 
FAILURE 
The  proposals  for  changing  bank  regulations  are 
concerned  with  their  likely  effect  on bank  failures.  This  section 
illustrates  how  the probability  of bank  failure  is affected  when 
banks  and  nonbanking  firms  combine. 
*  Similar  proposals  have  been  made  by  Kareken  (1986), 
Gilbert  (1987),  Tobin  (1987)  and  Forrestal  (1987).  Tobin 
proposes  limiting  the  assets  of  all  banks  to  short-term,  low-risk 
assets. 
7 Kev  Factors  Affecting  the Profits  and Risks  of  Combining  Banks 
and  Nonbanking  Firms  ’ 
’  The  factors  that determine  the expected  value  and  variance 
of profits  of a firm  that buys a bank and a nonbanking  firm  can be 
expressed  in  the  following  equations: 
E(B+N)=E(B)+EO, 
v(B  +  N)  =  V(B)  +  v(N)  +  2cov(B,N), 
where  E refers  to expected  value,  V to variance,  B to  the profits 
of the bank,  N to the profits  of the nonbanking  firms  and  COV to 
the covariance  of the profits  of the bank  and  the nonbanking  firm. 
Holding  constant  the covariance  of the two profit  streams,  a higher 
variance  in  the  profits  of  the  nonbanking  firm  means  a  higher 
variance  in the profits  of the combined  firms.  The variance  of the 
combined  profit  streams  depends  on  the  covariance  of  the  two 
profit  streams.  Finally,  as  the  size of  the  nonbanking  firm  rises 
relative  to the size of the bank,  the variance  of the combined  profit 
streams  converges  to the variance  of the profits  of the nonbanking 
firm. 
An  analysis  of  the  proposals  to  restructure  the  financial 
system  involves  an  analysis  of  the  mean  and  variance  of  the 
returns  to  shareholders  of  a  firm  that  buys  a  bank  and  a 
nonbanking  firm  and  operates  them  under  the  conditions  of  the 
various  proposals.  One  approach  to  this  analysis  might  involve 
expressing  the  mean  and  variance  of  the  profits  of  the  firm  that 
buys  the  bank  and  the nonbanking  firm  in  terms  of  the  mean  and 
variance  of  the  profits  of  the  bank  and  the  nonbanking  firm 
separately,  as indicated  in the equations  above.  The problem  with 
this  approach  is  that  the distribution  of  returns  to  shareholders  is 
not  the  same  as  the  distribution  of  profits.  In  some  outcomes, 
losses  exceed  the  investment  of  the  shareholders;  losses  to 
shareholders,  however,  are  no larger  than  their  investment  in  the 
firm.  The  distinction  between  the  distribution  of  profits  and  the 
distribution  of  returns  to  shareholders  is especially  important  for 
this  study,  since  the  various  proposals  involve  different  rules  for 
truncating  the  losses  to  shareholders.  Analysis  of  the  mean  and 
variance  of  returns  to  shareholders  must  be  based  on  specific 
distributions  of the profits  of the bank and the nonbanking  firm,  as 
presented  in the text, not on the expected  value  and variance  of the 
profits. 
8 If a bank  offers  nonbanking  services,  the  effect  on  both 
the expected  rate  of return  and  the variability  of  returns  to the 
bank’s  shareholders,  as well  as the risk  of  failure  for  the  bank, 
depend  on  five  factors.  Suppose  a bank  merges  with  a 
nonbanking  firm.  One  important  factor  is the average  level  of 
expected  profits  or  rate  of  return  for  the  nonbanking  service.  A 
second  factor  is the  “risk”  associated  with  the prospective 
nonbanking  service;  risk  is often  measured  by  the  standard 
deviation  of the profits  or  rates  of  return.  A m  factor  is the 
correlation  between  the profit  rates  of  the bank  and  nonbanking 
firm.  A fourth  factor  is the  size of the  bank  relative  to the 
nonbanking  firm.  The  third  and  fourth  factors  are  important 
because  the bank  may  actually  reduce  its risk  by  acquiring  a 
nonbanking  firm  that  has a higher  coefficient  of variation  of 
profits  than  the bank.  This  possibility  will  be demonstrated 
later. 
The  fifth  factor  that  must be considered  is the 
“synergies”  (increase  in profits)  involved  in  combining  banking 
and  nonbanking  services  in the  same organization.  Offering 
banking  and  nonbanking  services  through  the  same  firm  may 
reduce  the cost of providing  the  services  and  may  attract 
customers  who  value  the  wider  array  of  services  offered  by  the 
9 combined  bank-nonbank  firm.  These  synergies  could  produce 
profit  rates  that exceed  the sum of  the profit  rates  of banks  and 
firms  in  the nonbanking  industry  operating  as separate 
corporations. 
Some  Emoirical  Estimates  of  Rates  of  Return  and  Risk 
A number  of  studies  have  investigated  the profit  rates 
and  risk  in banking  and  selected  nonbank  activities.”  One 
finding,  demonstrated  in table  2,  is that both  the average  profit 
rate  and its  standard  deviation  are  lower  in banking  than  in 
several  industries  that banks  would  be permitted  to enter  under 
the recent  proposals. ‘*  Indeed,  the  standard  deviation  of  return 
on equity,  one  measure  of risk,  is lowest  in table  2 for  the 
banking  industry.  Another  key  finding  of  these  studies  is that 
the profit  rates  of banks  are  not positively  correlated  with  the 
profits  of  firms  in  many  industries  that  they  would  be permitted 
to enter.  Thus,  banks  could  diversify  their  risk  by  entering 
lo  Eisenbeis  and  Wall  (1984)  survey  these  studies.  For  a 
summary  of  more  recent  studies,  see  Boyd,  Graham  and  Hewitt 
(1993). 
l1 Some studies  measure  returns  to shareholders  using data on 
stock prices  and dividends.  These  studies  report  similar  patterns: 
mean  rates  of return  and variability  of returns  to shareholders  are 
higher  in several of the industries  that banking  organizations  would 
be  permitted  to  enter  than  in  the  commercial  banking  industry. 
See Boyd  and  Graham  (1988),  Boyd,  Graham  and  Hewitt  (1993), 
Eisemann  (1976) and Macey,  Marr  and  Young  (1987). 
10 many  nonbanking  industries,  even  if the profits  of  firms  in  those 
industries  are  more  variable  than  those  of banks. 
Table  3 illustrates  the potential  reduction  in variability  of 
bank  profits  possible  through  mergers  with  firms  that  offer  other 
financial  services.  The  table  illustrates  this  with  the coefficient 
of  variation,  a measure  of relative  risk  that  is calculated  by 
dividing  the  standard  deviation  of  the profit  rates  by  the  mean. 
The  results  demonstrate,  using  a hypothetical  situation  involving 
the  relative  size of banking  and  nonbanking  components  of  the 
firm,  that  the combined  firm  can  have  the  same or  even  lower 
risk  than  the bank  itself,  even  though  risk  is higher  in  the 
nonbanking  industries. 
Boyd,  Graham  and Hewitt  (1993)  simulate  mergers  of 
banking  firms  with  firms  in other  financial  industries,  using 
accounting  and  stock  market  data.  Simulated  mergers  with  life 
and  property/casualty  insurance  companies  reduce  the  risk  of 
bankruptcy,  but  mergers  with  securities  and  real  estate  firms 
increase  the risk  of bankruptcy  of banking  firms. 
Because  banks  have  not  yet  entered  the various 
nonbanking  industries,  there  is little  evidence  on  the  magnitude 
11 of  the  synergies  involved  in combining  banks  with  other 
firms . l2  There  is evidence,  however,  of  synergies  for  banks 
and  selected  financial  activities.  For  example,  before  the 
separation  of commercial  banking  and investment  banking  in  the 
193Os, securities  affiliates  of commercial  banks  held  a large 
share  of  the investment  banking  business.13  In  nations  where 
commercial  banking  organizations  may offer  investment  banking 
services,  commercial  banking  organizations  have  large  shares  of 
the investment  banking  business. l4 
An Illustration 
The  effects  of permitting  banking  organizations  to offer 
nonbanking  services  on  the risk  and returns  in  banking  are 
analyzed  using  two probability  distributions  of profits,  one  for  a 
hypothetical  bank  and  another  for a nonbanking  firm.  These 
probability  distributions,  presented  in table  4,  are  designed  to 
reflect  the results  of  studies  of risk  and returns  in  banking  and 
l2  Several  studies  estimate  the  effects  of  the  combination  of 
services  offered  by  banks  on  their  costs.  See  Gilligan,  Smirlock 
and  Marshall  (1984),  Benston,  et.  al.  (1983)  and  Clark  (1988). 
The  results  of  these  studies  are  not  relevant  in  estimating  the 
effects  of nonbanking  services  on the costs of banks,  since the data 
are  for  banks  subject  to  current  limitations  on  the  services  they 
may  offer. 
l3 White  (1986). 
l4  Da&in  and  Marquardt  (1983). 
12 various  nonbanking  industries  summarized  above.  Profit 
distributions  are  combined  in  table 5 under  various  assumptions 
that  reflect  the proposals  for  restructuring  the  financial  system 
described  in  table  1.  Table  6 shows the  returns  to  shareholders 
and  the expected  loss  to the FDIC  for  the  four  cases  analyzed  in 
table  5. 
The  illustration  is designed  to be simple.  Differences 
among  the  four  cases  might  change  under  assumptions  that 
would  make  the analysis  more  complex.  For  instance,  the 
management  of  the firm  that  buys  the bank  and  the  nonbanking 
firm  is assumed  to make  no changes  that  affect  the  capital  ratios 
or  the probability  distributions  of profits.  Analysis  of  the  cases 
under  alternative  assumptions  is beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
The  bank  begins  the current  year  with  book  value  of 
equity  equal  to $100.  The  market  value  of the  bank  is assumed 
to equal  its book  value  prior  to financial  restructuring,  which 
permits  the affiliation  of  the bank  with  the nonbanking  firm.  As 
presented  in  table  4,  the  (discrete)  probability  distribution  of  the 
bank’s  profits  in the current  year  has three  possible  outcomes:  a 
1 percent  chance  of a loss  of  $110,  which  would  cause  the  bank 
13 to  fail,  a 98 percent  chance  of a profit  of  $10  (a  10 percent 
return  on equity)  and a  1 percent  chance  of a profit  of  $130.15 
Table  4 also presents  the probability  distribution  of 
profits  of  a nonbanking  firm  that  begins  the  year  with  book 
value  capital  of  $100.  The  market  value  of  the  nonbanking  firm 
is also  assumed  initially  to equal  $100.  The  nonbanking  firm  is 
riskier  than  the bank:  the coefficient  of variation  of  its profits  is 
higher  than  that  of the bank.  This  specification  was chosen  to 
reflect  the greater  variability  of profits  shown  in  table  2 in  some 
of  the industries  that banking  institutions  wish  to enter. 
The  effects  of combining  the bank  and  the nonbanking 
firm  in  the same  corporation  are  examined  using  three 
indicators:  the expected  return  to shareholders  as a percent  of 
capital,  the coefficient  of variation  of  returns  to shareholders  of 
the consolidated  firm,  and the  expected  loss  to the  FDIC  from 
the bank’s  failure.  These  measures  are  calculated  in  table  4 for 
both  the bank  and the nonbanking  firm  as separate  organizations 
to provide  benchmarks  for  comparison.  The  distribution  of 
returns  to shareholders  differs  from  the distribution  of profits 
I5  The  large  profit  of  the  bank  associated  with  the  small 
probability  might reflect  the recovery  on loans  previously  charged 
off as losses or a large  favorable  change  in market  interest  rates on 
portfolios  of  assets  and  liabilities  that  do  not  have  matched 
duration. 
14 because  losses  to  shareholders  are  limited  to the amount  of  their 
initial  investment  in the  firm.  Thus,  losses  to shareholders  are 
limited  to $100  for  the bank  and  $100  for  the  nonbanking  firm. 
The  expected  loss  to the FDIC  is calculated  as follows.  The 
bank  fails  in  only  one of  the  three  possible  outcomes:  a loss  of 
$110,  with  a chance  of  1 percent.  The  loss  to the FDIC  in  that 
outcome  would  be $10,  since  the initial  capital  of  the bank  is 
$100.  Thus,  th e expected  loss  to the  FDIC  is $10  (loss  to 
FDIC)  X 0.01  (probability)  =  $0.10. 
In  deriving  the distribution  of  returns  to shareholders  in 
table  5,  one  must  specify  their  investment,  which  determines 
their  maximum  loss  and the  denominator  used in calculating 
their  expected  rate  of  return.  The  shareholders’  initial 
investment  is  measured  as  the book  value  of  the combined 
firms.  The  use of book  value,  net of  any  accounting  goodwill 
resulting  from  the acquisition  of  the bank  and  the  nonbanking 
firm,  provides  a basis  for  specifying  bankruptcy.  Book  value 
also  provides  a common  denominator  for  comparisons  of 
expected  rates  of  return  in  the various  cases.  The  market  value 
of  the  firm  that  buys  the bank  and  the  nonbanking  firm  will 
exceed  their  combined  book  value.  If this  were  not  the  case, 
15 the combination  of  these  firms  in  the  same corporation  would 
not  benefit  the  shareholders. 
The  profits  of  the bank  and  the nonbanking  firm  are 
assumed  to be  statistically  independent  and,  thus,  uncorrelated. 
This  assumption  simplifies  the analysis;  it is also  consistent  with 
some of  the evidence  cited  previously  for  several  industries  that 
banks  could  enter.  For  each outcome  for  the profits  of  the 
bank,  there  are  three  possible  outcomes  for  the profits  of  the 
nonbanking  firm.  If combined  into  one  firm,  there  would  be 
nine  possible  outcomes  for  the returns  to shareholders  of  the 
consolidated  firm,  as table  5 illustrates. 
Table  5 and  6 ignore  the existence  of  synergies  from 
combining  a bank  with  a nonbanking  firm;  they  assume  that 
there  is no  increase  in the joint  profits  resulting  from  lower 
costs  or a wider  array  of  services  to offer  customers.  As 
previously  mentioned,  it is difficult  to determine  the  magnitude 
of  such  synergies,  given  that  such combinations  have  been 
unlawful  for  many  years.  Such  synergies,  of course,  must exist 
to  make  such combinations  attractive  to shareholders;  investors 
can easily  obtain  the benefits  of diversification  by  owning  shares 
of  firms  with  uncorrelated  profits.  In this paper,  however, 
assumptions  about  the  size of  the  synergies  are  unnecessary;  the 
16 relevant  comparisons  are  made between  the various  cases.  An 
increase  in the  levels  of profits  for each  outcome  would  not  alter 
the  differences  among  the four  cases  examined  in  tables  5 and  6, 
unless  the  synergies  eliminate  bankruptcy  in  all  outcomes. 
Merger  of  the Bank and  the Nonbanking  Firm:  The  Simnlest 
& 
Each  proposal  described  in table  1 calls  for  the  new 
activities  of banking  organizations  to be conducted  through 
corporate  entities  that  are  separate  from  banks.  This  feature  of 
the proposals  reflects  the view  that  the chances  of  bank  failure 
and  the potential  loss  to the FDIC  would  be higher  if the 
organizations  that  own  banks  offered  nonbanking  services 
through  their  bank  subsidiaries,  rather  than  through  subsidiaries 
that  are  separate  from  the banks. 
This  view  is not  valid  under  all  circumstances,  as case  1 
in  tables  5 and  6 illustrates.  In this  case,  the bank  begins 
offering  nonbanking  services  by  merging  with  the  nonbanking 
firm  that  has the profit  distribution  presented  in  table  4.  The 
capital  of  the bank  after  the merger  is $200.  Given  the 
underlying  profit  distributions  in  table  4,  there  is only  one 
outcome  in which  the bank  fails:  in outcome  #  1, the  returns 
from  the banking  and  nonbanking  activities  yield  the  largest 
17 possible  losses.  In that  outcome,  the  shareholders  lose  their 
total  investment.  The  bank  remains  in operation  in all  of  the 
other  outcomes.  In outcomes  # 2 and  # 3,  in  which  the losses 
from  banking  operations  are  large  enough  to  make  the  bank  fail 
if operating  as a separate  corporation,  the profits  from  the 
nonbanking  operations  and the increased  capital  of  the bank 
resulting  from  the  merger  keep the bank  from  failing. 
The  expected  loss  to the FDIC  in  case  1 depends  on  what 
happens  to the liabilities  of  the nonbanking  firm  after  the 
merger.  Suppose  the  nonbanking  segment  of  the  merged  firm 
continues  to borrow  from  the  same  sources  it used before  the 
merger.  If the claims  of these  lenders  are  subordinated  to the 
claims  of  depositors,  the  merger  might  reduce  the expected  loss 
to the  FDIC,  perhaps  to zero. 
In  this  illustration,  however,  the  merged  organization 
converts  all  of  its liabilities  to federally  insured  deposits.  If the 
bank  involved  in  the  merger  goes bankrupt,  the FDIC  absorbs 
losses  above  the capital  of  $200.  In outcome  #  1, because  the 
bank’s  maximum  loss  after  its  merger  with  the nonbanking  firm 
is $225,  the loss  to the FDIC  is $25.  Although  the  maximum 
loss  to the FDIC  is larger  after  the  merger,  the expected  loss 
18 ($25 X 0.0005)  i s actually  smaller  after  the merger  (compare 
tables  4 and  6). 
The  effects  that a merger  have  on  the possibility  of bank 
failure  and  the expected  loss  to the FDIC  depend  on  the  size of 
the  nonbanking  firm  relative  to the bank.  To  illustrate,  suppose 
the bank  merges  with  a nonbanking  firm  whose  distribution  of 
profits  is  10 times  as large  for each  outcome  as that presented  in 
table  4 and  whose  capital  is $1,000.  In  this  case,  which  is not 
shown  in  the table,  the expected  loss  to the FDIC  would  be 
$2.04,  much  larger  than  the expected  loss  shown  in  table  6. 
Thus,  in  considering  a restructuring  of  the financial  system,  the 
size of  the bank  relative  to the nonbanking  firm  is an  important 
determinant  of the expected  loss  to the FDIC. 
Affiliation  of a Bank  with a Nonbanking: Firm 
If banks  combine  with  nonbanking  firms,  one  way  to 
limit  the FDIC’s  expected  loss  is to require  that  banks  remain 
separate  corporations  within  their  parent  organizations  and  limit 
FDIC  insurance  only  to the deposit  liabilities  of  the banks. 
Within  such structures,  the principle  of corporate  separateness 
would  prevent  the nonbanking  firm’s  creditors  from  claiming  the 
assets  of the bank. 
19 The  risk  and  return  characteristics  of a holding  company 
that buys  the bank  and  the  nonbanking  firm  are presented  in 
case  2.  Under  this case,  labelled  “affiliation,  corporate 
separateness, ” losses  to  shareholders  of the  holding  company 
resulting  from  losses  by  the nonbank  subsidiary  are  limited  to 
the capital  of  the nonbank  subsidiary.  The  bank  does  not  rescue 
the nonbank  subsidiary  by absorbing  the additional  losses.  In 
turn,  if the bank  has losses  that  exceed  its capital,  the  nonbank 
subsidiary  does  not  rescue  the bank  by absorbing  the  additional 
losses.  There  is assumed  to be no lending  among  units  of  the 
holding  company.  The  holding  company  lends  to neither  the 
bank  nor  the  nonbank  subsidiary,  and  the bank  lends  nothing  to 
the nonbank  affiliate.  The  nonbank  affiliate  borrows,  instead, 
from  nonaffiliated  lenders;  the liabilities  of  the bank  are  covered 
by  FDIC  insurance. 
The  expected  return  to the shareholders  is higher  and  the 
variability  of  returns  is lower  in case 2 than  under  a similar 
combination  of  firms  arranged  through  a merger.  Thus,  the 
shareholders  benefit  more  from  a combination  of  the  bank  and 
the nonbanking  firm  as affiliates  of a holding  company  than 
through  the  merger  of  these  firms. 
20 The  benefit  to the  shareholders,  however,  comes  partly  at 
the expense  of  the FDIC.  The  FDIC’s  expected  loss  is the  same 
in case  2 as in  the benchmark  case in  table  4 but higher  than 
under  the  merger.  Under  affiliation  and corporate  separateness, 
the outcomes  in  which  the FDIC  is exposed  to losses  are 
determined  by  the probability  distribution  of the bank’s  profits. 
Under  the  merger  illustrated  in case  1, in contrast,  losses  in 
outcomes  # 2 and  # 3 that  would  make  the bank  fail  are 
absorbed  by  the profits  of  the nonbank  segment  of  the  merged 
firm  and  the capital  contributed  by  the nonbanking  unit.  Under 
affiliation  and corporate  separateness,  however,  the expected 
loss  to the FDIC  does  not depend  on  the  size 
of  the bank  relative  to its nonbank  affiliate. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  PROPOSALS 
Merger  or  Affiliation 
The  cases in  tables  5 and  6 indicate  that,  under  some 
conditions,  the risk  of  FDIC  loss  would  be lower  if a bank 
engages  in a nonbanking  activity  directly,  rather  than  through 
affiliation  with  a nonbanking  firm.  In considering  proposals  for 
financial  restructuring,  therefore,  it is unnecessary  to prohibit 
21 the direct  offering  of nonbanking  services  through  banks  under 
all  circumstances. 
The  Financial  Services  Holding  Comnanv  (FSHC)  Proposal 
The  proposals  by  the Association  of Rank Holding 
Companies  (LaWare  (1987)) and  the Association  of  Reserve 
City  Rankers  (1987) would  permit  FSHCs  to acquire  banks  as 
subsidiaries  under  the condition  of affiliation  and corporate 
separateness.  The  bank  could  not  use its assets  to rescue  a 
failing  nonbank  affiliate,  and  the FSHC  would  not  be required 
to rescue  a failing  bank. 
A comparison  of case  2 in  table  6 with  table  4 shows 
how  the  formation  of FSHCs  can affect  risk  in banking. 
Affiliation  of a bank  with  a nonbanking  firm  reduces  the 
probability  that  the bank  will  fail  only  if affiliation  yields 
synergies  that  raise  the profits  of  the bank  for  each  possible 
outcome.  Thus,  affiliations  between  banks  and  nonbanking 
firms  that  facilitate  diversification  of  risk  for  shareholders  of 
banking  firms  reduce  the probability  of bank  failure  and  the 
expected  loss  to the FDIC  only  if there  are  synergies  from 
combining  banking  and nonbanking  firms  in the  same 
organization. 
22 The  Heller  “Double  Umbrella”  Proposal 
The  distribution  of returns  to shareholders  under  the 
Heller  (1987) proposal  is presented  under  case  3 in  table  5.  The 
implications  of this proposal  can be illustrated  by  comparing  the 
distribution  of returns  to shareholders  under  various  outcomes  in 
cases  2 and  3.  Under  the Heller  proposal,  the losses  of  the 
bank  and  nonbank  subsidiary  in outcome  #  1 absorb  all  of  the 
capital  of  the holding  company.  The  FDIC  has a loss  of  $10 in 
that  outcome,  the amount  by  which  the loss  of  the bank  exceeds 
its capital.  In outcome  # 2,  the bank  has a loss  that  exceeds  its 
capital,  but the holding  company  is required  to cover  that  loss, 
drawing  on  its profit  of $15 from  the nonbanking  subsidiary  and 
its capital.  The  holding  company  also  covers  the  large  loss  of 
the  bank  in  outcome  # 3.  In outcomes  # 4 and  # 7,  in contrast, 
the  holding  company  does not  absorb  all  of  the  losses  of  the 
nonbanking  subsidiary.  Instead,  the  nonbanking  subsidiary  goes 
bankrupt.  The  holding  company  writes  off  its investment  of 
$100,  and  nonaffiliated  lenders  absorb  the additional  loss  of  $15 
in each  of  these  outcomes. 
The  minimum  level  of  synergies  necessary  to make 
combinations  of banks  and  nonbanking  firms  attractive  to 
investors  is higher  under  the Heller  proposal  than  under  the 
23 FSHC  proposal.  The  diversification  of  risk  illustrated  in  case  2 
could  be achieved  through  a mutual  fund  that buys  shares  in 
firms  in banking  and nonbanking  industries.  Any  synergies 
would  make  the  shareholders’  expected  rate  of return  higher 
with  the bank  and  nonbanking  firm  combined  in  the firm  under 
affiliation  and  corporate  separateness  than  through  a mutual 
fund.  To  make  combinations  of banks  and  nonbanking  firms 
under  the Heller  proposal  attractive  to  shareholders,  synergies 
would  have  to exceed  a level  necessary  to compensate  the 
holding  company  for  the expected  cost of  bailing  out  the  failing 
bank  subsidiary. 
The  synergies  necessary  to make  the affiliation  of banks 
with  nonbanking  firms  profitable  under  the Heller  proposal 
would  be different  for each  potential  combination  of  firms.  For 
case  3,  the  synergies  would  have  to raise  the returns  to 
shareholders  by  $0.095  to make  them  equal  to the expected 
returns  to shareholders  in  case 2,  and  even  more  to compensate 
shareholders  for  the higher  variability  of  returns  in case  3.16 
l6  Returns  to the  firm  in  column  3 are  lower  than  returns  in 
column  2 by  $10 in  outcome  # 2,  with  probability  of  0.009,  and 
lower  by  $10  in  outcome  #  3,  with  probability  of  0.0005. 
Multiplying  $10 by  each  of  the  probabilities  and  summing  yields 
$0.095. 
24 The  CorriP;an Pro_posal 
Corrigan  (1987) assumes  that  the  methods  of  insulating 
banks  built  into  the proposals  of  FSHCs  will  be ineffective. 
This  view  is based  on evidence  that  BHCs  are  integrated 
organizations  that  have  used all  of  their  resources,  including 
those  of their  bank  subsidiaries,  to support  any  nonbank 
subsidiary  in danger  of  failing.  Corrigan  also  expresses  concern 
that,  in approving  the acquisition  of  banks  by  nonbanking  firms, 
the  federal  supervisory  authorities  will  extend  the  federal  safety 
net  to the parent  organizations  themselves. 
The  Effects  of Loans  to Nonbank  Affiliates  on 
Stockholder  Wealth  -- The  Corrigan  proposal  reflects  these 
views  on  the relationship  between  banks  and  their  parent 
organizations.  Case 4 in tables  5 and  6 examines  whether  such 
concerns  reflect  rational,  profit-maximizing  behavior.  The 
Corrigan  proposal  assumes  that  firms  are  willing  to risk  the 
assets of  their  bank  subsidiaries  to aid  their  nonbank 
subsidiaries.  One way  for a holding  company  to do  this  is to 
allow  the bank  to lend  directly  to the  nonbank  subsidiary.  To 
illustrate  this,  the bank  in case 4 lends  $10 to the  nonbank 
affiliate  at a zero  interest  rate,  thus  subsidizing  the  nonbank 
subsidiary  at the expense  of  the bank. 
25 Several  assumptions  have  been  made to derive  the 
probability  distribution  of  returns  for  shareholders  of  the holding 
company.  First,  the bank  loan  is assumed  to be  subordinated  to 
other  debt of  the nonbank  affiliate.  If the  nonbank  affiliate  goes 
bankrupt,  therefore,  the bank  absorbs  the  first  $10 of  losses  to 
creditors.  Second,  the interest  rate  on riskless  assets  is assumed 
to be 5 percent.  The  distribution  of profits  for  the  bank  is 
derived  by subtracting  $0.50  from  the profits  for  each  possible 
outcome  presented  in  table  4;  this reduction  reflects  the 
opportunity  cost of  foregoing  an alternative  investment  of  $10 at 
the riskless  rate. 
The  nonbank  subsidiary  saves $1.053  in interest  expense 
on  the  $10 it borrows  from  the bank;  this is the amount  that  a 
risk-neutral  lender  charges  to compensate  for  the risk-free  rate 
of  5 percent  and the 5 percent  chance  of  losing  the  $10 principal 
and  foregoing  the interest  income  if the nonbanking  firm  goes 
bankrupt. l7 
l7  The  interest  rate  that  the  nonbank  affiliate  would  pay  to 
borrow  from a nonaffiliated  lender is determined  by calculating  the 
rate  that  would  make  the expected  return  on  such a loan  equal  to 
the  risk-free  interest  rate.  Let  rl  be the  interest  rate  on  the  loan 
and  rs the risk-free  rate.  In lending  $10 to the  nonbank  affiliate, 
there  is a 95 percent  chance  of collecting  the principal  plus interest 
at  the  rate  rl  and  a  5 percent  chance  of  losing  the  principal  and 
collecting  no  interest.  The  expected  returns  on  the  alternative 
investments  are  calculated  as follows: 
26 The  effects  of  this loan  on  the distribution  of 
shareholders’  returns  are  illustrated  in  table  5 under  case  4.  In 
outcomes  #  1, # 4 and # 7,  the bankruptcy  of  the nonbanking 
firm  imposes  an additional  loss of  $10 on  the bank.  In  outcome 
#  1, in which  the bank  has its largest  losses,  the FDIC  absorbs  a 
loss  of  $20.50  ($10 loss  from  the underlying  distribution  in  table 
5,  $0.50  loss  of interest  income  on  the loan  to the  nonbank 
affiliate  and  $10 loss  on the loan  to the  nonbank  affiliate). 
The  cost  saving  by  the nonbank  affiliate  due  to the  zero 
interest  loan  from  the bank  raises  the returns  to  shareholders  by 
$1.053  in all  outcomes  except  those  in  which  the  nonbank 
affiliate  goes  bankrupt.  The  return  to  shareholders  is $0.01 
higher  in  case 4 than  in case  2;  this  difference  is not  large 
enough,  however,  to raise  the expected  rate  of  return  in  table  6 
by  1 basis  point.  The  important  difference  between  the 
distributions  of returns  in case  4 and  case  2 is that  the 
coefficient  of variation  of  the returns  is higher  in case  4.  Thus, 
it is not  in  the  shareholders’  interest  to have  their  bank  lend  to 
rl X $10 X 0.95  - $10 X 0.05  =  rs  X  $10. 
If  t-3  is 5 percent, 
rl  =  [0.05  +  0.051  i  0.95  =  0.1053. 
27 its nonbank  subsidiary,  even  at a subsidized  rate.  Such  loans 
make  their  returns  more  variable. 
Typically,  bank  supervisors  would  make  such a loan 
even  less  attractive  to the  shareholders.  Because  the loan  to the 
nonbank  affiliate  raises  the expected  loss  to the FDIC,  bank 
supervisors  would  require  the bank  to maintain  a higher  capital 
ratio.  Though  the bank  could  raise  its capital  ratio  by  reducing 
its  total  assets  while  keeping  its capital  unchanged  the asset 
reduction  would  reduce  the  level  of profits  for  each  possible 
outcome  the bank  faces. 
This  analysis  is consistent  with  evidence  that  few  banks 
make  loans  to  their  nonbank  affiliates  up to the limits  allowed 
by  regulation.  Rose  and Talley  (1983) examine  transactions 
among  affiliates  of 224 of  the 229 BHCs  that  filed  reports  with 
the Federal  Reserve  from  the  fourth  quarter  of  1975 through  the 
fourth  quarter  of  1980.  In  1980, 27 percent  of  the BHCs  had 
no  transactions  among  affiliates.  Among  the  16 BHCs  in  which 
the  bank  subsidiaries  made  larger  loans  to the  nonbank  affiliates 
than  the  nonbank  affiliates  made  to the banks,  loans  to the 
nonbank  affiliates  in  1980 were  only  1.3 percent  of the  capital 
of  the bank  subsidiaries. 
28 Banking  Risk  under  Assumntions  Other  Than  Profit 
Maximization  -- The  distribution  of returns  in cases  2 and  4 
reflect  the assumption  that,  if the bank  does  not  lend  to  the 
nonbank  affiliate,  the affiliate’s  bankruptcy  does  not  affect  the 
bank’s  profits.  In a few cases,  however,  the bankruptcy  of a 
nonbank  subsidiary  of a holding  company  has induced  depositors 
to withdraw  their  deposits  from  the bank  subsidiary.‘*  The 
management  of a holding  company,  therefore,  might justify 
loans  from  a bank  subsidiary  to a nonbank  affiliate  as a way  to 
prevent  the nonbank  subsidiary  from  going  bankrupt  and  thus 
make  depositors  less concerned  about  the  safety  of  their 
deposits.  In this  case,  the costs  of bailing  out  the  nonbanking 
subsidiary  might  be less than  the cost of adverse  reaction  by 
depositors. 
There  have  been  several  cases in which  the  management 
of  a BHC  used the resources  of a bank  subsidiary  to aid  a 
nonbank  affiliate  in distress.  In  the  mid-1970s,  for  example,  the 
holding  company  that owned  the Hamilton  National  Bank  of 
Chattanooga,  Tennessee,  arranged  for  the bank  to buy  low- 
quality  mortgages  from  a mortgage  banking  affiliate.  The 
mortgage  purchase  was an important  factor  that  led  to the  failure 
l8  Comyn,  et.  al.  (1986). 
29 of  the bank.19  In  October  1987, to cite  another  case,  the 
Continental  Illinois  National  Bank  made a loan  that  exceeded  its 
limits  for  loans  to one  customer  to a subsidiary  that  deals  in 
options.  The  subsidiary  suffered  a large  loss  after  the  sharp  fall 
in  stock prices  that  month. 
The  rationalization  behind  bank  loans  to bail  out  the 
nonbank  affiliate  overlooks  an alternative  that  might  be  more 
favorable  to the  shareholders  of  the holding  company:  let  the 
nonbank  subsidiary  go bankrupt  and  sell the bank  to another 
party.  Losses  to the  holding  company  would  be limited  to its 
investment  in  the nonbank  subsidiary,  with  nonaffiliated  lenders 
forced  to absorb  any  additional  losses.  If potential  bidders  are 
concerned  that  the bank  made loans  to the failing  nonbank 
affiliate  or in  some way  assumed  responsibility  for  the  debts  of 
that  affiliate,  the FDIC  could  facilitate  the  sale by  offering  to 
reimburse  the winning  bidder  for  any  losses  resulting  from  the 
failure  of  the nonbank  affiliate. 
Management  of  the holding  company  may  prefer  to have 
the bank  absorb  the losses  necessary  to bail  out  the  failing 
nonbank  affiliate,  rather  than  sell the bank,  which  will  result  in 
the  loss  of  their jobs.  It may be in  management’s  interest  to 
l9  Ibid.,  p.  186. 
30 arrange  for  the bank  to lend  to the nonbank  subsidiary  and pray 
that  some  favorable  outcome  helps  the holding  company  remain 
solvent.  The possibility  of  such action  is why  government 
supervisors  must remain  aware  of any  financial  problems  in 
firms  that own  banks  and  must  subject  the bank  subsidiaries  of 
those  firms  to particularly  close  supervision. 
The  analysis  in  tables  5 and  6 of  a bank  lending  to its 
nonbank  affiliate  is based  on  the assumption  that  the loan  is used 
for  legitimate  business  purposes.  Loans  from  a bank  to a 
nonbank  affiliate,  of course,  could  be made  for  fraudulent 
purposes.  Suppose  a bank  is permitted  to make a loan  of  any 
amount  to an affiliate.  One  method  of  stealing  from  a bank 
would  be to buy  the bank  through  a holding  company,  arrange 
for  a loan  that  exceeded  the investment  of  the holding  company 
in  the bank  and  disappear  with  the proceeds  of  the loan. 
The potential  for  fraud  indicates  that  it may  be prudent  to 
prohibit  loans  to affiliates  that  exceed  the capital  of a bank. 
This  prohibition  would  not  prevent  all  forms  of  fraud  in 
banking,  but its violation  would  indicate  to the bank  supervisors 
when  a bank  is vulnerable  to this  type  of  fraud.  It is also 
prudent  to screen  the background  of  those  who  buy  banks 
31 through  holding  companies,  as the federal  bank  regulatory 
agencies  do  when  individuals  buy  banks. 
The  FDIC  (1987) proposal  calls  for  greater  authority  to 
audit  the terms  of any  loans  banks  make  to affiliates  or 
subsidiaries.  This  proposal  does  not  indicate  what  bank 
examiners  would  look  for  in  such audits.  Audits  to detect  fraud 
would  be appropriate. 
The  Safe  Bank  Proposal 
The  so-called  safe bank  proposal  (Litan  (1987))  is 
intended  to  reduce  the expected  level  and  standard  deviation  of 
profit  rates  of  banks  subject  to the  “safe bank”  asset  restrictions. 
As the appendix  indicates,  for  each  $100 of  assets  shifted  from 
business  loans  to Treasury  bills,  the revenue  of the  safe bank 
would  decline  by $1.26.  The  asset limitations  for  safe  banks 
may  be  so restrictive  that  they  would  prevent  many  affiliations 
of banks  with  nonbanking  firms  that  would  promote 
diversification  or benefit  society  through  synergies. 
One  way  to evaluate  the  safe banking  proposal  is to 
compare  the  size of  the  synergies  necessary  to  make bank 
acquisitions  profitable  for  nonbanking  firms  to the  synergies 
necessary  under  alternative  proposals.  Suppose  the bank  had 
32 loans  of $600.*’  If the bank  becomes  a safe bank  by 
reinvesting  the  $600 in Treasury  bills,  its revenue  falls  by 
$7.56.  It must,  however,  continue  to pay  competitive  interest 
rates  on deposits  after  becoming  a subsidiary  to avoid  a decline 
in  its deposits.  Thus,  synergies  from  the operation  of  the  bank 
as a subsidiary  must be worth  at least  $7.56  to the holding 
company.  This  amount  can be compared  to the  synergies 
necessary  to make  the acquisition  of a bank  subsidiary  profitable 
under  the Heller  proposal,  which  is $0.095  for  the  case 
examined  above. 
This  large  difference  reflects  the fact  that  the  safe bank 
proposal  imposes  a significant  opportunity  cost on  a nonbanking 
firm  that  buys  a bank  under  each  possible  outcome.  The  Heller 
proposal,  on  the other  hand,  imposes  a loss  on  the nonbanking 
firm  under  an  unlikely  outcome  -- the  failure  of  the  bank 
subsidiary.  These  comparisons  suggest  that  fewer  combinations 
of banking  and  nonbanking  firms  that  would  promote 
diversification  of risk  and,  possibly,  more  efficient  use of 
*O Suppose  the bank  has a capital-to-asset  ratio  of  10 percent. 
For  all  federally  insured  commercial  banks,  the  average  ratio  of 
loans  to  assets  is  about  60  percent.  Thus,  $600  is  a  reasonable 
level  for loans  of the hypothetical  bank  with  capital  of $100 and a 
10 percent  capital  ratio. 
33 resources  would  be viable  under  the  safe bank  proposal  than 
under  the Heller  proposal. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper  illustrates  the potential  for  risk  diversification 
through  the common  ownership  of  a hypothetical  bank  and 
nonbanking  firm.  The  illustration  has  several  implications  for 
proposals  for  restructuring  the  financial  system.  Banks  are  not 
necessarily  made  safer  by  requiring  that  all  nonbanking  activities 
be conducted  through  separate  subsidiaries.  On the  contrary, 
banks  may be less vulnerable  to failure  if some  nonbanking 
activities  are offered  through  the banks  directly.  Moreover,  the 
expected  loss of  federal  deposit  insurance  funds  may  be lower 
even  if the nonbanking  activities  are  financed  through  insured 
deposits. 
The  major  proposals  for  restructuring  the  financial 
system  would  permit  firms  in various  industries  to buy  banks 
and  operate  them  as separate  subsidiaries.  Some  of  the 
proposals  build  in  safeguards  to prevent  nonbanking  firms  from 
using  the resources  of their  bank  subsidiaries  in ways  that  would 
increase  both  the chance  for  bank  failure  and  the expected  loss 
of  the  federal  deposit  insurance  funds.  These  restrictions  are 
34 based  on  the presumption  that,  without  such safeguards, 
nonbanking  firms  would  use the resources  of  their  bank 
subsidiaries  to benefit  their  nonbank  subsidiaries. 
The  analysis  in  this  paper  indicates  that  the  shareholders 
of a holding  company  generally  do not benefit  by  having  their 
bank  subsidiary  lend  at a subsidized  interest  rate  to the  nonbank 
subsidiary.  In  fact,  shareholders  are  made  worse  off  by  such 
transactions  because  the holding  company  profits  become  more 
variable.  Transactions  that  benefit  nonbank  subsidiaries  at the 
expense  of bank  subsidiaries  do not  increase  the  shareholders’ 
wealth.  The  greatest  danger  in banks  lending  to affiliates 
involves  management  of  holding  companies  attempting  to save 
their jobs  by bailing  out  nonbank  subsidiaries  and  fraudulent 
schemes  to  steal  from  banks  through  loans  to affiliates. 
Two  of the proposals  place  special  constraints  on  the 
nonbanking  firms  that buy  banks  to limit  the risks  of  bank 
failure.  One proposal  requires  that  the  holding  companies 
absorb  all  losses  incurred  by banks,  up to the  holding  company’s 
total  capital.  The  other  proposal  requires  the bank  subsidiaries 
of  nonbanking  firms  to hold  only  low-risk  liquid  assets.  Both 
proposals  raise  the level  of  synergies  necessary  to  make  the 
acquisition  of  banks  by  nonbanking  firms  profitable.  Of these 
35 proposals,  the  safe banking  proposal  is the  more  restrictive. 
Some  consolidations  of banking  and  nonbanking  firms  that 
would  yield  social  benefits  in  the form  of  higher  profits  and 
reduced  variation  in  stockholder  returns  would  not be attractive 
to shareholders  under  the  safe banking  proposal  but would  be 
attractive  under  other  proposals. 
36 REFERENCES 
Association  of  Reserve  City  Bankers.  Association  of Reserve 
City  Bankers Emerging Issues Committee  Proposal  for  a 
Financial Services Holding Company  (March  19,  1987). 
Benston,  George  J.,  et.  al.  “Economics  of  Scale  and  Scope  in 
Banking, ” in  Proceedings of a Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition  (Federal Reserve  Bank  of 
Chicago,  May  2-4,  1983), pp.  432-55. 
Black,  Fischer,  Merton  H.  Miller,  and  Richard  A.  Posner.  “An 
Approach  to the Regulation  of  Bank  Holding 
Companies,”  Journul of Business (July  1978),  pp.  379- 
412. 
Boyd,  John  H.,  and  Stanley  L.  Graham.  “The  Profitability  and 
Risk  Effects  of  Allowing  Bank Holding  Companies  to 
Merge  With  Other  Financial  Firms:  A Simulation 
Study,”  Federal  Reserve  Bank of Minneapolis  Quarterly 
Review (Spring  1988), pp.  3-20. 
Boyd,  John  H.,  Stanley  L.  Graham  and R.  Shawn  Hewitt. 
“Bank Holding  Company  Mergers  with  Nonbank 
Financial  Firms:  Effects  on  the Risk  of Failure,”  Journal 
of Banking  and  Finance  (February  1993), pp.  43-63. 
37 Clark,  J.A.  “Economies  of  Scale and Scope at Depository 
Financial  Institutions:  A Review  of  the Literature, 
“Federal  Reserve  Bank of Kansas  City  Economic  Review 
(September/October  1988), pp.  16-33. 
Comyn,  Anthony,  et.  al.  “An Analysis  of the  Concept  of 
Corporate  Separateness  in BHC Regulation  from  an 
Economic  Perspective,  * in Proceedings of a Conference 
on Bank Structure and Competition  (Federal  Reserve 
Bank of Chicago,  May  14-16,  1986), pp.  174-212. 
Corrigan,  E.  Gerald.  Financial Market Structure:  A Longer 
View (Federal Reserve  Bank of New  York,  January 
1987). 
Da&in,  Alan  J.,  and Jeffrey  C.  Marquardt.  “The  Separation  of 
Banking  from  Commerce  and the  Securities  Business  in 
the United  Kingdom,  West  Germany  and Japan, ” Issues 
in Bank Regulation  (Summer  1983), pp.  16-24. 
Department  of  the Treasury.  Modernizing  the Financial 
System  (February  1991). 
Eisemann,  Peter  C.  “Diversification  and the  Congeneric  Bank 
Holding  Company,”  Journal of Bank Research (Spring 
1976), pp.  68-77. 
38 Eisenbeis,  Robert  A.,  and Larry  D.  Wall.  “Bank Holding 
Company  Nonbanking  Activities  and  Risk,  in 
Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Market Structure 
and Competition  (Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago, 
April  23-25,  1984), pp.  340-57. 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation.  Mandate  for  Change: 
Restructuting  the Banking Industry  (October  1987). 
Forrestal,  Robert  P.  “Regulations  Must Evolve  Along  with 
Financial  Services  Industry, ” Address  to the  Economics 
Club  of  Connecticut,  December  4,  1987, reprinted  in  the 
American Banker (December  23,  1987), pp.  4-7. 
Gilbert,  R.  Alton.  “Banks Owned  by  Nonbanks:  What  is 
the Problem  and What  can be Done  about  It?,”  Business 
and Society (Roosevelt  University,  Spring  1987),  pp.  9- 
17. 
.  “A Comparison  of  Proposals  to Restructure  the 
U.S.  Financial  System, ” Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St. 
Louis  Review  (July/August  1988), pp.  58-75. 
Gilligan,  Thomas,  Michael  Smirlock,  and William  Marshall. 
“Scale and  Scope Economies  in  the Multi-Product 
Banking  Firm, ”  Journal of Monetary  Economics (May 
1984), pp.  393-405. 
39 Heller,  H.  Robert.  “The  Shape of Banking  in  the  199Os,” 
Address  before  the Forecasters  Club  of  New  York,  June 
26,  1987. 
Huertas,  Thomas  F.  “The Protection  of  Deposits  from  Risks 
Assumed  by Non-bank  Affiliates,”  in Structure and 
Regulation  of Financial Firms and Holding Companies 
(Part 3),  Hearings  before  a Subcommittee  of  the 
Committee  on  Government  Operations,  House  of 
Representatives,  99 Cong.,  2 Sess. (December  17 and 
18,  1986), pp.  32560. 
.  “Redesigning  Regulation:  The  Future  of Finance  in 
the United  States,”  Issues  in Bank Regulation (Fall 
1987), pp.  7-13. 
Kareken,  John  H.  “Federal  Bank Regulatory  Policy:  A 
Description  and  Some  Observations,”  JournaZ  of Business 
(January  1986), pp.  3-48. 
LaWare,  John  P.  “FSHCA  -- The  Flexible  Alternative  for 
Financial  Restructuring,  ” Issues  in Bank Regulation (Fall 
1987), pp.  25-27. 
Litan,  Robert  E.  What  Should Banks Do?  (The  Brookings 
Institution,  1987). 
40 Macey,  Jonathan  R.,  W.  Wayne  Mar-r, and  S. David  Young. 
“The  Glass-Steagall  Act and  the Riskiness  of  Financial 
Intermediaries,  ” mimeo  (Tulane  University,  November 
1987). 
Rose,  John  T.  “Government  Restrictions  on  Bank  Activities: 
Rationale  for  Regulation  and Possibilities  for 
Deregulation,  ” Issues in Bank Regulation (Autumn 
1985),  pp.  25-33. 
Rose,  John  T.  and  Samuel  H.  Talley.  “Financial 
Transactions  Within  Bank  Holding  Companies,”  Staff 
Studies  123 (Board  of  Governors  of  the Federal  Reserve 
System,  May  1983). 
Spong,  Kenneth.  Banking Regulation: Its Purposes, 
Implementation,  and E$ects (Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas  City,  1985). 
Tobin,  James.  “A Case  for  Preserving  Regulatory 
Distinctions,”  Challenge (November/December  1987)) 
pp.  10-17. 
Volcker,  Paul  A.  “Appendices  to the Statement  by  Paul 
A.  Volcker,  Chairman,  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System,”  in Structure and Regulation of 
Financial Firms and Holding Companies (Fart I), 
41 Hearings  before  a Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on 
Government  Operations,  House  of  Representatives,  99 
Cong.,  2 Sess.  (April  22,  June  11, and  July  23,  1986), 
pp.  391-510. 
White,  Eugene  Nelson.  “Before  the  Glass-Steagall  Act:  An 
Analysis  of  the Investment  Banking  Activities  of  National 
Banks,”  Explorations in Economic History (January 
1986), pp.  33-55. 
42 Table 1' 







Direct or in- 
direct ownership 
of banks by non- 







Association  of 
Bank Holding 
Companies 
LeWare  (1987)) 
FSHCs would  own 
BECs  and holding 
companies  that own 
firms  engaged  in 
financial 
activities  in 
addition to  banking. 
Association  of 
Reserve  City 
Bankers  (19872 
FSCHs  would 
directly  own 










Obligation  to 
support bank 
subsidiaries 
Supervision  of 
banks  and BHCs 
unchanged.  No 
one agency 
supervises  FSBCs, 
which  may own 
BHCs  and holding 
companies  that 
own firms in 
financial  industries 
other  than banking. 
Subsidiaries  of 
FSHCs  in nonbanking 
industries  subject 












in section 23B 
of the Federal 
Reserve Act. 
Same  as  for 
the Association 






Heller  (1987) 
BHCs could  acquire 
banks  and firms 
engaged  in 
financial 
activities.  Non- 




Keep  current 
restrictions 
No  conssent  on 
the supervisory 
powers  of the 
Federal  Reserve 
over BHCs.  Non- 
bank  subsidiaries 
of BHCs subject 
to supervision 
by their own 
government 
authorities. 
BECs must  absorb 
losses of bank 
subsidiaries. 
Nonbanking  firms 
must  absorb losses 
of their BECs. 
Current 
restrictions 
Federal  Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation  (1987) 
Firms  in any 
industry  could 
buy banks.  and 
banks  could 
engage  in 
nonbanking 
activities 




restrictions  on 
dividends  and 
lending  limits of 
banks.  Make 
these restrictions 
and those in 
sections  23A and 
23B of the Federal 
Reserve  Act  apply 
to transactions 
between  banks  and 
their subsidiaries. 
Firms  that buy 
banks not  subject 
to supervision  by 
bank  supervisors. 
Banks  required  to 
report  all trans- 
actions with 
affiliates  or 
subsidiaries  to 
bank  supervisors, 
which  could audit 





Corrinan  (1987) 
Firms  that 







Keep  current 
restrictions 
Firms  that  own 
banks  subject 
to supervision 
by the federal 
bank  supervisors, 
including 
exercise  of 
powers  to limit 
risks  (such as 
capital  require- 
ments)  and 
aggregate  concen- 
tration  in the 
financial  system. 
No’  formal 
obligation,  but 
general  cormsitment 
to be  a source  of 





Litan  (1987) 
Firms  engaged  in 
any  activities 
could  buy banks, 
subject  to 
restrictions  on 
the  assets  held 
by  those banks. 
Yes 
Prohibit  banks 
owned  by nonbanking 
organizations  from 
lending  to 
affiliates. 
Nonbank  firms  that 
own banks  not 
subject  to bank 
supervisors  except 
to verify  that 
those  banks  held 
only  the designated 
safe  assets. 
None 
Bank  subsidiaries 
of nonbanking  firms 
may hold  only 
Department  of the 
Treasury  (1991) 
Firms  in any  industry 
could own FSBCs. 
FSECs,  in turn,  could 
own  federally  insured 
banks  and firms  that 
offer  other  types  of 
financial  services, 
including  securities 
and insurance  services. 
Yes 
Stronger  firewalls  on 
transactions  between 
banks  and nonfinancial 
affiliates. 
Federal  bank  supervisory 
agencies  provide  "umbrella 
oversight"  of FSHCs  and 
their bank  subsidiaries 
but no oversight  of 
nonfinancial  firms  that 
own FSHCs. 
None 
Limit  investments  of  l 
banks  to those  permissible 
for national  banks. Table  2 
Means  and  Standard  Deviations  of  Profit  Rates  for  Firms  in  Financial  Service 




return  on 




Commercial  banks  12.3% 
Thrift  institutions  3.4 
Securities  brokers  13.0 
Securities  underwriters  16.4 
Large  investment  banks  only  21.5 
Life insurance  underwriters  13.7 
Property-casualty  insurance underwriters  11.9 
Insurance brokers  and agents  12.2 










SOURCE: Litan  (1987), p. 64. Table  3 
Variability  of Profits of Hypothetical  Firms formed through the Merger  of Banks 






Banks plus savings  and loan associations 
Banks plus personal  credit  agencies 
Banks plus business  credit  agencies 
Banks plus  securities  and commodities  brokers 
Banks plus  life insurance 
Banks plus mutual  insurers 
Banks plus  insurance  agents 
Banks plus real estate  operators  and lessors 











NOTE: A time series  of the profits  of each hypothetical  firm is formed by 
assuming  that 75 percent  of the assets of the hypothetical  firm are 
devoted  to banking  and 25 percent  are devoted  to the nonbanking 
activity.  The coefficient  of variation  is derived  for the constructed 
time series. 
SOURCE: Litan  (1987), p. 88. Table 4 
Probability  Distributions  of the Profits of a Bank 
and a Nonbanking  Firm Prior to Merger  or Affiliation 
Outcome 
Bank 
Return  to 
Probabilitv  Profits  shareholders 
A  0.01  -$llO  -$lOO 
B  0.98  10  10 
C  0.01  130  130 
Outcome 
Nonbanking  firm 
Return  to 
Probability  Profits  shareholders 
A  0.05  -$115  -$lOO 
B  0.90  15  15 
C  0.05  145  145 
Nonbanking 
Expected  return  to shareholders 
as a percentage  of capital  10.1%  15.75% 
Coefficient  of variation  of 
returns  to shareholders  1.6117  2.4637 
Expected  loss to the FDIC  $0.10 .,. ._  _....._  z_l.i  ,r,. Table  6 
Returns  to Shareholders  and Losses  to the FDIC Under Various 
Combinations  of a Bank and a Nonbanking  Firm 
Case 
number 









Coefficient  of  Expected 
variation  of  loss 
returns  to  to the 
shareholders  FDIC 
Merger  12.51%  1.7754  $0.0125 
2  Affiliation,  12.93  1.6278  0.1000 
corporate 
separateness 
3  Affiliation,  12.88  1.6434  0.0050 
Heller 
proposal 
4  Affiliation,  12.93  1.6860  0.1100 
corporate 
separateness; 
bank  lends $10 
at zero interest 
rate to nonbank 
affiliate. APPENDIX 
The  Op_portunity Cost  of  Holding  Safe Assets 
The  safe bank  proposal  (Litan  (1987))  would  put  the 
bank  subsidiaries  of  nonbanking  firms  at a disadvantage  in 
competing  for  deposits  by  restricting  the return  on  their 
investments.  This  disadvantage  could  be offset  slightly  by 
waiving  deposit  insurance  premiums  for  the  subsidiaries  of 
nonbanking  firms.  Under  the requirements  for  holding  only  safe 
assets,  the  subsidiaries  of  nonbanking  firms  would  not  expose 
the  federal  deposit  insurance  funds  to potential  losses;  therefore, 
an argument  could  be  made  for  exempting  “safe”  banks  from 
deposit  insurance  premiums. 
The  opportunity  cost  of investing  in Treasury  securities 
instead  of  loans  is estimated  using  data  from  the  functional  cost 
analysis  program  of  the Federal  Reserve.  A change  in  the 
composition  of a bank’s  assets  affects  its interest  revenue  and 
expenses.  The  functional  cost data  includes  information  on 
interest  income  and  expenses  allocated  to various  categories  of 
loans,  as well as expenses  involved  in purchasing  and  holding 
securities.  Table  Al  indicates  that  the gross  yields  on  loans 
almost  always  exceed  those  on  three-month  Treasury  bills.  Net 
43 yields  on  loans,  which  reflect  expenses  and  losses,  are  lower 
than  the  net yields  on Treasury  bills  in  some  years  for  mortgage 
and  installment  loans. 
Table  A2 isolates  the comparisons  between  net  yields  on 
Treasury  bills  and those  on  three  categories  of loans.  Net  yields 
on  mortgages  and  installment  loans  tend  to fall  below  the  net 
yields  on Treasury  bills  in periods  of  sharp  increases  in  interest 
rates.  The  most  stable  spread  is that between  the  net yield  on 
commercial  and  other  loans  and  the net  yield  on Treasury 
securities.  On average,  banks  lose  $1.26  in net income  before 
income  taxes per  dollar  transferred  from  commercial  loans  to 
Treasury  bills. 
44 Table Al 
Gross and Net Yields  on Bank Assets 
Treasury  Real estate  Installment  Commercial  and 
bills  mortgage  loans  other  loans 
Number  of 
Year  banks  Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net 
1972  86  4.07%  3.92%  7.58%  6.82%  10.19%  6.54%  6.71%  5.35% 
1973  96  7.04  6.88  8.11  7.35  10.29  6.65  8.44  7.21 
1974  99  7.89  7.72  8.57  7.77  10.77  6.90  10.53  9.09 
1975  98  5.84  5.67  8.17  7.36  11.01  6.81  8.88  7.17 
1976  109  4.99  4.83  8.39  7.46  11.11  6.91  8.22  6.39 
1977  102  5.27  5.11  8.84  7.89  11.05  7.31  8.21  6.46 
1978  85  7.22  7.08  8.88  7.93  11.43  8.02  9.67  8.16 
1979  80  10.04  9.86  9.32  8.39  12.00  8.57  12.23  10.68 
1980  59  11.51  11.28  10.01  9.29  12.90  9.18  14.31  12.62 
1981  63  14.03  13.81  10.80  9.88  14.90  10.94  16.85  14.86 
1982  76  10.69  10.54  10.84  9.95  15.87  11.96  14.96  12.36 
1983  90  8.63  8.47  11.02  9.95  14.98  11.07  11.93  9.26 
1984  82  9.58  9.43  11.41  10.31  14.39  11.10  12.82  10.34 
1985  81  7.48  7.31  11.60  10.33  13.41  10.16  11.30  8.91 
1986  75  5.98  5.75  10.21  8.50  12.50  9.11  10.21  7.73 
NOTE: Data on the gross and net yields  for the three categories  of loans are derived  from 
the functional  cost accounting  data.  These data are for the banks with  total assets 
greater  than $200 million.  The second column  indicates  the number  of banks  in that 
size category  that reported  data for the investment  function  each year.  The choice 
of this largest  size category  in the functional  cost accounting  reports  is based  on 
the assumption  that the safe banks  owned by relatively  large nonbanking  firms would 
tend to have assets above this dollar level.  Net yields  on loans reflect  adjustments 
of the gross yields  for expenses  in making  and servicing  loans and loss rates on the 
various  types of loans.  The gross yields on Treasury  bills  are the annual  averages 
of yields  on three-month  Treasury bills, new issues.  Net yields  on Treasury  bills 
are the gross yields  minus  the costs of buying  and holding  investments  per dollar of 
investments  in the functional  cost accounting  data.  Under  the safe bank  proposal, 
safe banks could hold longer-term Treasury securities, but the longer-term  securities 
have  greater potential  for capital gains and losses.  This exercise  uses  the yields 
on short-term  Treasury  securities  and ignores capital  gains and losses. Table A2 
Sacrifice  of  Income  Before  Income  Taxes  per  $100 Dollars  of  Loans  Shifted  to 
Treasury  Bills 
Loan Categories 
Year 
Real estate  Installment 
mortgages  loans 
Commercial  and 
other  loans 
1972  $2.90  $2.62  $1.43 
1973  0.47  -0.23  0.33 
1974  0.05  -0.82  1.37 
1975  1.69  1.14  1.50 
1976  2.63  2.08  1.56 
1977  2.78  2.20  1.35 
1978  0.85  0.94  1.08 
1979  -1.47  -1.29  0.82 
1980  -1.99  -2.10  1.34 
1981  -3.93  -2.87  1.05 
1982  -0.59  1.42  1.82 
1983  1.48  2.60  0.79 
1984  0.88  1.67  0.91 
1985  3.02  2.85  1.60 
1986  2.75  3.36  1.98 
Mean  .768  .905  1.262 